HOUSTON (AP) - The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board issued an urgent safety recommendation for the first time in its history Wednesday, requesting that BP PLC form an independent panel of experts to review safety at the company's five North American refineries.
The federal agency is investigating an explosion and fire that killed 15 workers and injured 170 at the company's Texas City refinery in March. Since then, a number of fires and other incidents prompted the action, the board said.
"In light of recent events in Texas City, and the findings of our team, we determined that this recommendation could not wait for the completion of our full root-cause investigation next year," CSB chairwoman Carolyn W. Merritt said. "We also concluded that an examination of BP's corporate oversight and culture is an essential ingredient for the full understanding of the tragedy in Texas City."
BP Group chief executive John Browne said the company would work with the panel and quickly enact any recommendations.
"The Texas City explosion was the worst tragedy in the recent history of BP, and we will do everything possible to ensure nothing like it happens again," he said in a statement. "Today's recommendation from the CSB is a welcome development, and we take it seriously."
The board said the urgent recommendation before a complete investigation is the first in its eight-year history. The board plans to release its preliminary findings related to the March explosion and fire on Oct. 27 during a community meeting.
The board says it has identified safety management lapses that could pose a threat "considered to be an imminent hazard and has the potential to cause serious harm unless rectified in a short time frame."
The CSB wants the independent panel to spend 12 months reviewing safety management and culture issues within BP, similar to the investigation conducted following the space shuttle Columbia disaster.
BP will pay for the independent panel's review, but Merritt said CSB will oversee its work.
The panel will review the company's corporate safety culture, its safety oversight, near-miss reporting and investigation and mechanical integrity programs.
Merritt said the independent panel could "have a major positive impact on the safety of BP's North American operations, and it can also serve as a model for others in industry."
Chemical plants throughout the country could have some of the same lapses or hazards as BP and so far had "good luck," Merritt said.
The chemical safety board has often investigated plants with multiple hazards over many years and she has been surprised "that so much time has gone by where they have run operations with hazards and nothing has happened. That gives a false sense of security that nothing can happen."
The March 23 BP blasts occurred in a unit that boosts the octane level of gasoline. The refinery processes 433,000 barrels of crude oil a day and 3 percent of the nation's gasoline.
CSB Lead Investigator Don Holmstrom said a work order for a level transmitter on the unit was filled out 13 days before the deadly blast, but the work wasn't done.
As the unit was started up after routine maintenance, the transmitter gave control room operators a series of inaccurate readings. In the hours leading to the explosions, the transmitter failed to indicate dangerous levels of hydrocarbons that were flooding the unit.
"Instead of repairing the transmitter prior to startup, the work order indicated that the maintenance would be deferred until after the unit was up and running," Merritt said.
BP spokesman Ronnie Chappell says the level indicator worked as designed and isn't created to inform operators when levels go beyond 100 percent.
Documentation reviewed by CSB also indicates two high-level alarms on the unit were in need of repair. One of the two, Merritt said, required weekly maintenance to "try to keep it functioning."
"Those two alarms were fully considered by BP's investigation team and their failure to go into alarm was not seen as a critical factor," Chappell said.
There have been a variety of other issues reported at BP's plants.
In late July, there was a serious hydrogen fire in another unit at the Texas City refinery. Weeks later, on Aug. 10, a hole developed in a valve that handles high pressure gas and oil. The incident resulted in a community order for residents to stay in their homes.
Then last week, there was a process-related fire at BP's plastics subsidiary in Alvin.
"These are footprints of a safety culture that needs to be examined," Merritt said. "We don't know if there are other like hazards at these other facilities."
BP operates refineries in Texas, California, Indiana, Washington and Ohio.
Merritt said BP has embraced the recommendation, which she says will provide a panel of experts that the CSB itself cannot offer.
