Violence, and in particular gun violence, in our K-12 schools has altered both the perception and reality of the safety of the K-12 school environment. No one would argue that the human cost has not been tragically high; there have been far too many victims. But there is a forgotten victim in all this.

The entire K-12 school system of the United States has been, to an extent, victimized by the incidents at Columbine, Sandy Hook, Parkland, Uvalde and all the rest. This is not hyperbole. It is a simple acknowledgment of the fundamental alteration in both perception and reality for K-12 schools. The entire K-12 school system of the United States has been victimized. Issues of school operations for students, parents, teachers, administrators, and policymakers have been fundamentally altered.

Every School Is Different, So Is Every Security Risk

School safety is always a thorny topic, particularly following an incident of violence in a school. As we grapple with the fallout, policymakers at both the state and federal levels are under intense pressure to act and be seen as doing “something” to make schools safer.  Couple this with an incredible amount of noise and chaos in the school security space, with manufacturers, vendors, and school safety advocacy organizations pressuring for the immediate purchase and deployment of the things they make, sell, or advocate for. This creates a “perfect storm” situation, ripe for poor decision-making.

In most cases, I do not ascribe ill intent to any of the parties involved, but I am fond of a quote from Vikram Seth: “God save us from people who mean well”.  This quote applies here. Far too often recently, the answer has been a one-size-fits-all statutory mandate to deploy a specific technology or process universally at all the schools under their jurisdiction.

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. No “one size fits all” solution. No “buy this one thing” school safety remedy. No “just do this, and your school will be safe” process.  The radical differences in exposure, security posture, school community demographics, location, building design and condition, and a dozen other factors preclude a universal “best” answer to security improvement at any individual school.

Monies are being allocated and mandates developed. With well north of three billion dollars annually from a variety of sources directed at school security issues in the United States, the issue is less a lack of funding and more a lack of understanding to address the foundational needs. These well-intentioned mandates fail to account for the unique conditions that exist in every school and district in the United States.

The Forgotten Foundation of School Security

Recent research from the ALERRT Center at Texas State University reaffirms that a classroom door with proper locking hardware is a leading practice in school security. This aligns with recommendations in ASIS International’s School Security Standard, P.A.S.S. K-12 School Safety and Security guidelines, and the “Foundational School Physical Security” position paper. There is consensus that a classroom door that meets the guidance’s requirements is an effective protective factor against an active shooter incident.

Current recommendations are that all classroom doors in a K-12 school should be fire-rated, solid-core types installed in welded metal frames with appropriate hardware and a lockset that can be secured from the interior of the classroom without a key. Door hardware should be ASTM and UL listed and meet IFC, NFPA, and ADA requirements. Secondary locking, barricade, and blockade-type devices not listed and not meeting applicable code should not be used.

According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the average age of a main instructional school building is 49 years, and 38% of these facilities were built before 1970. This indicates a significant area of extreme exposure for as many as half of all schools in the United States.

So how did we get to the current condition?  Design planning assumptions were different.  Well into the 1990’s, classroom door hardware was designed to preclude a student from locking the door while a teacher was outside the classroom. In some cases, this meant that there was no locking mechanism on the interior side of classroom doors. In others, it meant a keyway requiring a metal key was installed. In either case, there are significant operational impediments to quickly locking the classroom door, particularly in a high-stress incident. This creates a significant vulnerability for as much as half of all classrooms in the U.S.

This has also created a whole segment of the school security industry, manufacturing and aggressively marketing classroom door secondary locking and blockade devices that, in most cases, fail to meet classroom egress code requirements.

In any school constructed before 1970, the door itself and the frame it is installed in could pose a vulnerability, as well. Lightweight interior-grade doors in wooden frames were the rule rather than the exception. Here, the design planning assumption was much more concerned with cost efficiency than with a classroom environment that could be quickly and effectively secured.

Understanding the research, it would seem to make sense to address this issue of classroom doors.  And that begs the question, “How many classroom doors in the United States fail to meet the standard?”  While specific data is unavailable, inferences can be drawn from the school's age and the building code in effect at the time of construction.

Technology Can't Replace Physical Readiness

The current focus of legislative policymakers across the nation seems to ignore one of the most foundational needs: the ability to quickly and effectively lock the classroom door in favor of technology-based enhancements.

Many mandates focus on a silent panic alarm system directly connected to law enforcement. Often included is mandated GIS mapping of the school grounds and building. The intent is to provide both a faster response time and enhanced wayfinding for law enforcement during an active shooter event. I don’t disagree with the statement that this may benefit some schools in such an event. A 30-second reduction in response time from 4 minutes is significant and will likely save lives.

However, a school without the ability to effectively lock classroom doors will still be more exposed during that faster response. Don’t overlook that rural and remote schools (more than 50% of U.S. schools) with protracted response times will benefit significantly less from such a system. In both cases, a classroom door that can be quickly and effectively locked is a required school response.

Another area where we see emerging legislative mandates is weapons detection. Both walk-through and handheld systems are the subject of this effort. There is an increasing focus on AI-based visual weapons detection systems. These systems may well serve a viable prevention purpose. However, once detected, the foundational ability to quickly and effectively lock classroom doors in response will be an absolute requirement.

The recent news coverage on the deployment of attack drones in schools in both Georgia and Florida is equally concerning.  While I cannot prove it, I strongly suspect that there are classroom doors at schools in both states that do not meet the currently recommended standard. If I were a parent, student, or educator in a school lacking adequate classroom doors, the reported $ 550,000 allocated to the drone project in Georgia would be a matter of deep concern to me.

Last is a mandate for integrated emergency response technology. A noted practitioner, Guy Grace, calls this a unified life safety system. This is simply common sense: build a security program with systems that work together to achieve a defined goal. Still, a foundational element of this process must include consideration of the securable classroom door.   

Please do not misunderstand me. I am not a Luddite, simply opposed to security technologies. Certainly, security technologies and, as they mature, AI-enhanced school security systems in particular will play an increasingly important role in a school’s overall security posture. Equally, I’m not opposed to a stronger focus on school safety and security by our policymakers. And I am not opposed to more money directed to improve school safety and security. I am deeply opposed to that limited money being poorly spent and failing to address a school’s foundational physical security needs.

The likely outcome here will be akin to mandating that a school must have a roof for its security house when it lacks a foundation. The real risk is that limited funding will be misspent and fail to address the most pressing needs in any given school. A school that lacks appropriate classroom doors that can be locked from inside the classroom needs to be provided with this capability. The resources to address that vulnerability should be provided before legislating and statutorily requiring the deployment of any mandated technological system. The mandated system may well be effective, but it simply does not address the most pressing need in that particular school.

Policy Must Follow Risk, Not Headlines

As security professionals work with schools, and more importantly, with our policymakers, we need to dispel the idea that a universally mandated solution applied to every school will make all schools safer.  Equally, we need to help our policymakers understand the wide variance in security profiles between schools and districts. More heavily resourced school districts likely have many of the foundational elements of school security in place. Smaller, more rural districts and/or those with aging facilities are likely to lack some of the foundational components of effective school security.  This is a case where one size will not fit all.

The failure to focus on classroom doors is understandable. From the general perspective, a door is a door, and a lock is a lock. Doors have been in use forever. The general public and many of our policymakers lack understanding of the foundational function of the classroom door in school security. Additionally, doors and door hardware lack the appeal of the flashier technology-based solutions.  And last, we are fighting the perception that if you simply make the right purchase, that one act will make your school secure.

Our policymakers would do well to remember the old educational maxim “access before you treat,” and I would add “access before you spend.” The recommendation to conduct a comprehensive risk, threat, and vulnerability assessment at any school prior to purchasing and deploying security equipment or technology is an industry standard. This is so common that many federal security grant applications require the assessment component as part of the grant process.

A Secure School Is a Process, Not a Product

 I hope that this will foster a frank and open national discussion asking the simple question, “What are the foundational elements for a safe and secure school that should be available at every K-12 school and in place protecting every K-12 student in the country?”.  

Such a conversation will not be comfortable. There will be an acknowledgment that not all schools are equally secure, and not all students are equally safe. There will be financial implications. Hopefully, the outcome will be a better understanding of the foundational requirements for a secure school by both policymakers and the general public.  And the potential for a mechanism to provide resources to schools lacking those foundational elements. One size will never fit all.

There is one factor to be mindful of: regardless of the available resources, at its core, a secure school is not a purchase a school can make; it is a process the school must engage in. It will always be the people of a school community, effectively using the tools available to them to address their identified vulnerabilities and following their security processes with fidelity, who will create a more secure educational environment.