Exclusive Executive Q&A: Insights on Protecting Leaders in Today’s Threat Environment

Glen Kucera:
Three primary indicators stand out. Online behavior, such as escalating hostile chatter, doxxing attempts, or coordinated disinformation campaigns, often signals a rising risk. Travel patterns, including trips to high-crime areas, politically unstable regions, or major public events, also increase exposure. Finally, vetted threats from law enforcement or surveillance near residences, offices, or event venues demand heightened protection.

Dale Buckner:
The key question is whether a digital threat can be transferred into the physical realm. Specificity is the first major indicator: if a threat includes details such as “I know where you’ll be, what you’ll wear, and when you’ll arrive,” it signals reconnaissance and genuine intent. Another warning sign is when a threat actor reappears across different platforms or in person, indicating persistence and potential escalation. These factors separate a “keyboard bully” from a real-world threat.

Quantifying executive risk and security investment

Lasky: How should an executive’s “target score” (likelihood × impact) be quantified so security spend is proportional and defensible to the board?

Kucera:
A structured scoring model is effective. Likelihood factors include threat volume, credibility, geographic risk, online sentiment, and insider indicators. Impact factors include visibility, decision-making authority, symbolic importance, and contribution to enterprise value. Scoring each on a 1–5 scale produces a composite number; when the total exceeds a defined threshold, elevated protection is warranted and resource allocation becomes easier to justify.

(No corresponding response from Buckner.)

Adjusting security posture after high-visibility business decisions

Lasky: Which business decisions (M&A, PR stances, litigation) materially change an executive’s threat profile and therefore require immediate reassessment?

Kucera:
Decisions that raise visibility or spark controversy are the most impactful. Mergers and acquisitions, especially those involving job changes or cross-border operations, significantly increase risk. Litigation, whether regulatory, consumer, or environmental, draws unwanted attention. Public stances on divisive issues, large-scale restructuring, and major financial disclosures also necessitate reassessment.

(No corresponding response from Buckner.)

Redesigning event security for elevated threat levels

Lasky: How should in-person event security be redesigned when an executive is judged to be at elevated risk?

Kucera:
Elevated-risk events require more rigorous protocols. Venues should provide strong perimeters and multiple secure exits. Access control measures, such as credential checks, bag screening, magnetometers, and, in some cases, biometrics, are essential. Clear sightlines, secure VIP holding areas, ballistic-resistant infrastructure, secure travel routes, and visible deterrents such as canines or trained agents all contribute to prevention.

Buckner:
In today’s environment, event protection must go beyond close-in security. External coverage is equally critical. Recent incidents, such as the Trump assassination attempt, underscore the need for personnel scanning rooftops and high ground. Crowd watchers should be positioned strategically to identify vantage points for potential shooters. Event entry protocols must also become more formal—requiring verified credentials, tickets, and multiple access checks to prevent unvetted individuals from entering.

Securing executive offices and reducing insider threats

Lasky: What screening and access-control protocols should be in place at executive offices to reduce insider or workplace attack vectors?

Kucera:
Executive offices should mirror the security of critical facilities. Visitor management, including pre-registration and ID validation, is vital. Screening stations with bag checks and magnetometers strengthen defenses, while elevator and floor-access restrictions reduce exposure. Additional hardening measures, such as bullet-resistant glass, secure lobbies, and panic rooms, further mitigate the risks of insider or opportunistic threats.

Buckner:
Access to the executive calendar and travel schedule must be tightly controlled. Limit who knows where and when an executive will appear. C-suite areas should be physically secure and difficult to access without proper credentials, and travel or speaking engagements should not be widely publicized in advance. Announcing a “senior executive” appearance without naming the individual until 24–48 hours prior is a simple but effective safeguard.

Detecting and responding to internal radicalization

Lasky: How can organizations detect and respond to staff radicalization or coercion that could produce an internal threat to an executive?

Kucera:
Early detection relies on recognizing sudden behavioral changes, grievances, or fascination with violence. Anonymous reporting channels encourage staff to raise concerns safely and confidentially. Periodic vetting of employees with executive access, including financial, criminal, and social media checks, is essential. A coordinated HR–legal–security review process ensures timely intervention and response.

Buckner:
Monitoring is essential and should be clearly disclosed in employee agreements. Software tools can flag concerning keywords in emails, track online searches, or review communications for red-flag language. If an employee becomes disruptive or confrontational, leadership should immediately conduct a deconfliction review to determine whether reassignment, counseling, or termination is appropriate—followed by a three-to-six-month observation period.

Managing digital threats: Doxxing, deepfakes and location leaks

Lasky: How frequently should organizations monitor and remediate doxxing, deepfake videos, and location disclosures that could enable a physical attack?

Buckner:
If any member of the C-suite has a public profile or negative online association, monitoring should occur at least monthly. For executives facing sustained threats or persistent targeting, daily reports are warranted. Tracking trigger events, such as the release of personal data or deepfake content, must be ongoing and integrated with both intelligence and legal teams to enable rapid takedown or response.

(No corresponding response from Kucera.)

Coordinating with law enforcement on direct threats

Lasky: What are the most critical interagency notification steps when an executive receives an explicit assassination threat?

Kucera:
Local law enforcement should be notified immediately for documentation and patrol adjustments. The FBI or Joint Terrorism Task Force should be contacted if firearms, interstate travel, or signs of radicalization are involved. Industry fusion centers, such as DSAC or ISACs, help share intelligence across sectors. Internal stakeholders, including legal, HR, and communications, must also be engaged to manage both safety and reputational considerations.

(No corresponding response from Buckner.)

Lessons learned by recent executive threat incidents

Lasky: What lessons have executive protection teams learned over the last year from incidents involving senior political and corporate leaders?

Kucera:
Perimeter security is critical; once breached, even strong internal protocols can fail. Threat demographics are shifting, with younger, grievance-driven perpetrators often influenced by misinformation. Corporate attitudes have evolved; before December 2024, fewer than 20% of Fortune 500 CEOs had executive protection, but demand has since surged. Reporting costs in SEC filings has also normalized protection as a priority in enterprise risk management, rather than a perk.

Buckner:
Online threats are real and increasingly likely to become physical. We’ve crossed into a period where the social “red line” between disagreement and violence has blurred. Disenfranchised, radicalized, or mentally unstable individuals, combined with easy access to weapons, create a volatile mix. Protection teams must now leverage intelligence, data analytics, and digital monitoring as much as physical defense. A single close-protection agent is no longer sufficient; modern executive protection requires a networked, intelligence-driven approach.